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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 12-4513 
___________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
AHMED WALKER, 
Appellant 
     
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
  (District Court No.:  1-00-cr-00300-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia Rambo 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR. 34.1(a) 
on September 9, 2013 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 8, 2013) 
 
BEFORE:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
   
O P I N I O N  
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Defendant Ahmed Walker appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence for 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, conspiracy to 
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manufacture and distribute a controlled substance, and distribution of a controlled 
substance.  For the following reasons, we will vacate the judgment entered by the District 
Court and remand for resentencing. 
I.
1
 
 We write principally for the benefit of the parties and therefore recount only the 
facts essential to our review.  
On February 28, 2002, following a seven-day trial, a jury returned a verdict 
finding Walker guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), conspiracy to manufacture and 
distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and distribution of a 
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.   
On August 18, 2010, the District Court sentenced Walker to a prison term of 289 
months, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
2
  However, on June 29, 2012, the Supreme Court 
granted Walker’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District 
Court and remanded the case to the Third Circuit “for further consideration in light of 
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012).”  Walker 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 66 (2012).   Dorsey concerned provisions of the Fair 
Sentencing Act which reduced sentences applicable to crack cocaine offenses.  132 S.Ct. 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
2
 Due to several appeals and a habeas motion, this was the third of four sentences in 
Walker’s case.  The instant appeal concerns only the two most recent sentences. 
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2321 (2012).  We subsequently remanded the case to the District Court “for resentencing 
in light of Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. ___ (2012).”  (App. 30a.)    
In preparation for resentencing, Walker filed multiple objections to the                    
pre-sentence report and guideline calculations, including challenges to sentencing 
adjustments, the weight of certain controlled substances, and his criminal history.  At the 
resentencing hearing on December 10, 2012, the District Court noted Walker’s 
objections.  (Id. at 2a.)  However, the Court stated, “I’m going on record to indicate that I 
intend today to only resentence you in accordance with what this Court determines to be 
an order from the Court of Appeals to resentence only in light of Dorsey versus United 
States . . . In other words, I am only going to consider adjusting your sentence to reflect 
the change in the counting of crack cocaine and marijuana.  And that’s my position.”  
(Id.)  The District Court did not rule on any of Walker’s objections.  
The District Court then stated that while it was “precluding” Walker from 
addressing relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it would hear evidence 
pertaining to his post-sentencing rehabilitation.  (Id. at 3a-4a.)  The District Court heard 
testimony from two witnesses concerning Walker’s rehabilitation, and examined 
evidence including progress reports on his conduct while in prison.  (Id. at 5a-14a.)    
Walker was then resentenced to a term of 252 months’ imprisonment, with the Court 
varying downward from the guideline range, “based on the fact that [Walker] has 
incurred but one write-up in his entire time [in prison] except for one which occurred 
most recently.”  (Id. at 25a.)    
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II. 
Walker argues that the District Court erred by failing to conduct a de novo 
resentencing.  Specifically, “[w]hen a conviction on one or more interdependent counts is 
vacated on appeal, the resentencing proceeding conducted on remand is de novo unless 
we specifically limit the district court's authority.”  United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 
181-82 (3d Cir. 2010).  As noted above, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 
District Court in this case, and we remanded “for resentencing in light of Dorsey v. 
United States, 567 U.S. ___ (2012).”  (App. 30a.)    
The Government appears to concede that a de novo resentencing was required in 
this case.  Appellee’s Br. at 14 (“The United States acknowledges these three cases 
support re-sentencing de novo . . . .”).  However, the Government contends that the 
District Court did in fact conduct such a de novo resentencing.  We disagree.   
The District Court explicitly stated that it was resentencing Walker, “only in light 
of Dorsey versus United States,” and therefore precluded Walker from addressing 
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  (App. 2a-3a.)  The District Court then 
stated that “post-sentencing rehabilitation is a factor that I can consider even if I am just 
doing the Dorsey application . . .” and during the hearing received only evidence 
concerning Walker’s rehabilitation.  (Id. at 3a.)  Thus, the clear words and conduct of the 
District Court establish that the scope of the resentencing was severely cabined, and that 
a de novo resentencing did not occur.  Cf. United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of 
the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand . . . .”) 
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The District Court also did not rule on any of Walker’s objections to the pre-
sentence report and guideline calculations.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) requires that a 
court “must--for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted 
matter--rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the 
matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in 
sentencing.”  “This Rule is strictly enforced and failure to comply with it is grounds for 
vacating the sentence.”  United States v. Electrodyne Sys. Corp., 147 F.3d 250, 255 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  The failure of the District Court to address Walker’s objections constitutes 
reversible error and further confirms that the resentencing was not de novo.
3
   
III. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for de 
novo resentencing. 
                                              
3
 Because the District Court will conduct a de novo resentencing in this case, we decline 
to address on the current state of the record Walker’s argument that the District Court 
relied upon an inaccurate criminal history report.  
